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Abstract
The paper is organized around the following question: when the economy moves from a debt-
GDP level where the probability of default is nil to a higher level—the “fiscal limit”—where
that default probability is non-negligible, how do the effects of routine monetary operations
designed to achieve macroeconomic stabilization change? We find that the specification of the
monetary policy rule plays a critical role. Consider a central bank that targets the risky rate.
When the economy is near its fiscal limit, a transitory monetary policy contraction leads to
a sustained rise in inflation, even though monetary policy actively targets inflation and fiscal
policy passively adjusts taxes to stabilize debt. If the central bank targets the risk-free rate,
on the other hand, the same transitory monetary contraction keeps inflation under control, but
leads output to contract for a prolonged period of time. The comparison shows that sovereign
default risk put into sharp relief the tradeoff between inflation and output stabilization.
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1 Introduction
Economies may behave significantly differently in times of crisis. In this paper we are interested in
assessing, when the economy moves from a debt-GDP level where the probability of default is nil to
a higher level where that default probability is non-negligible, how the effects of routine monetary
operations change.
We find that the specification of monetary policy rule – whether central bank targets an interest
rate rule defined in terms of the risky or the risk-free nominal interest rate – plays a critical role.
If the central bank targets the risky rate and when the economy is near its fiscal limit, a transitory
monetary policy contraction leads to a sustained rise in inflation, even though monetary policy
actively targets inflation and fiscal policy passively adjusts taxes to stabilize debt. If the central
bank targets the risk-free rate, on the other hand, the same monetary policy contraction doesn’t
raise inflation, but leads to a sustained lower path for output for a prolonged period of time. The
intuition is following. If the central bank targets the risky rate, to satisfy a Taylor rule is equivalent
to postulating a risk-free rule that includes the usual positive response to inflation and a negative
response to the expected default rate. Higher expected default rates are accommodated with lower
risk-free rates and, therefore, higher inflation. These effects arise even though fiscal policy passively
adjusts taxes to stabilize debt.
The literature on the interactions between sovereign default and monetary policy rule typically
defines that rule in terms of the yield on risky government debt. In this paper, we show that such
a specification implicitly assumes that the monetary authority accommodates the rise in sovereign
default risk by lifting the inflation target. There are strong theoretical and empirical reasons to
expect causal links between sovereign default and the fragility of the banking system. For instance,
Sosa-Padilla (2015) argues that the main costs of sovereign default arise from the impact on the
balance sheets of banks holding that debt, as they sharply contract corporate lending leading,
while Brunnermeier et al. (2016) suggest that there may be a “diabolic loop” linking soveriegn and
bank credit risk. Such links can motivate why the central bank chooses to accommodate sovereign
risk. We contrast such a description of monetary policy with an alternative where the central bank
defines their policy rule in terms of the risk-free rate and is not seeking to offset default risk, cet.
par.. In a related paper, Reis (2016) shows that during a fiscal crisis, quantitative easing policies
can have powerful impact on macroeconomic outcomes through changing both the composition of
the privately-held public debt and the costs of government default in banking sector.
To explore this issue, we develop a model of the “fiscal limit” in the context of a conventional
new Keynesian model, with monetary and fiscal policy interactions. Monetary policy has real effects
in our sticky-price economy, which implies that, in addition to the usual impacts on intertemporal
consumption decisions, it also influences the size of the tax base and real debt service costs. On top
of this rich mix of monetary and fiscal policy interactions we introduce a fiscal limit as in Bi (2012),
whereby there is a partial default on outstanding government debt when the economy breaches a
certain debt-output threshold. This threshold depends upon the underlying fundamental shocks
to the economy, as well as stochastic fluctuations in political risk, so that bondholders demand
significant risk premia on government debt prior to hitting the fiscal limit.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section outlines our general model. In section
3, we use a simple endowment economy to explore how the possibility of debt default can cause
the monetary authorities to lose control of inflation when it targets the risky rate, even although
monetary policy remains active and fiscal policy passive in the sense of Leeper (1991). The quanti-
tative impact of this channel is then analyzed in section 4, where we first describe the setup of fiscal
limits and then discuss the dynamic impacts of an exogenous monetary contraction with different
specification of monetary policy rules. Given that the loss of inflation control would have real
effects in our sticky-price economy, we also explore the local determinacy properties of our model
in Appendix A, and find that a high rate of default could matter for equilibrium determinacy, but
it isn’t a concern for our benchmark calibration.
2 A General Model
As our aim is to explore how the possibility of sovereign debt default interacts with monetary and
fiscal policies, we consciously use a conventional new Keynesian model of the kind typically used to
explore monetary and fiscal policy interactions (see, for example, Benigno and Woodford (2004),
modified only by allowing government debt to be risky. Specifically, households in our economy
supply labor to imperfectly competitive intermediate goods producing firms who do not completely
adjust prices in the face of shocks since they face costly Rotemberg (1982)-style price adjustment.
Moreover, rather than rendering fiscal policy redundant by balancing the budget through lump-sum
taxes, we assume that households’ labor and profit income is taxed. This influences their labor
supply decisions, which in turn affects firms’ marginal costs and pricing decisions. Taken together,
this implies a relatively rich set of monetary and fiscal policy interactions: monetary policy has
real effects due to the assumption of price stickiness, which in turn affects both the size of the tax
base and real debt service costs. While fiscal policy, in the form of tax or government spending
changes have the obvious fiscal consequences, but also influence inflation either through the labor
supply response to distortionary taxation or the aggregate demand effect of changes in government
spending.1
We then further extend this model to allow for the possibility of sovereign default where a
haircut is applied whenever the economy hits its ‘fiscal limit’. This fiscal limit is defined as the
maximum expected present value of future primary surpluses, where the exact position of the Laffer
curve underpinning that definition depends upon both the state of the economy and the political
constraints on taxing at that maximum level. Given the stochastic nature of the fiscal limit (due
to exogenous fluctuations in productivity, government spending and political risk) investors may
demand risk premia on government debt before reaching the fiscal limit. This, in turn, affects debt
service costs and debt dynamics and may imply quite different monetary and fiscal policy impacts
in comparison to an economy operating well away from its fiscal limit.
1Reis (2017) looks at additional linkages between monetary and fiscal policy.
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2.1 Households Our cashless economy is populated by a large number of identical households
of size 1, who have preferences given by,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct, nt)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the households’ subjective discount factor, ct is consumption and nt the house-
holds’ labor supply. The household receives nominal wages Wt and monopoly profits Υt from the
firm, both of which are taxed at the rate, τt, and lump-sum transfers zt from the government. The
household chooses consumption, ct, hours worked, nt, and nominal bond holdings, Bt, to maximize
utility subject to their budget constraint,
Ptct +
Bt
Rt
= (1− δt)Bt−1 + (1− τt) (Wtnt + PtΥt) + Ptzt (2.1)
At each period, the government will partially default, at rate δt, if the existing debt level is above
a fiscal limit; otherwise it repays in full amount. Section 4 provides further discussion on the fiscal
limit. This probability of default is endogenous to the model, but is taken as given by households.
Bonds, therefore, pay a risky yield of Rt. First-order conditions for this optimization problem are:
1
Rt
= βEt
uc(t+ 1)
uc(t)
1− δt+1
pit+1
(2.2)
−un(t)
uc(t)
= wt (1− τt) (2.3)
where wt ≡Wt/Pt is the real wage. The first condition describes the household’s optimal allocation
of consumption over time, and the second, their optimal labor supply decision. Notice in the case
of the latter, labor income is taxed so that changes in the tax rate will influence households’ desire
to work.
Households can also trade in a risk-free bond, which is, however, in zero net supply, so that
where Euler equation (2.2) determines the risky nominal interest rate,
1
Rft
= βEt
uc(t+ 1)
uc(t)
1
pit+1
(2.4)
defines the risk-free nominal interest rate.
2.2 Final Good Production Final goods production is for the purposes of private and public
consumption and competitive final goods firms buy the differentiated products produced by inter-
mediate goods producers in order to construct consumption aggregates, which have the usual CES
form,
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
yt(i)
θ−1
θ di
) θ
θ−1
(2.5)
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where Yt is aggregate output, yt(i) the output of intermediate good firm i, and θ > 1 is the elasticity
of demand for each firm’s product. Cost minimization on the part of final goods producers results
in the following demand curve for intermediate good i,
yt(i) =
(
pt(i)
Pt
)−θ
Yt (2.6)
and an associated price index for final goods,
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
pt(i)
1−θdi
) 1
1−θ
(2.7)
2.3 Intermediate Goods Production The imperfectly competitive intermediate goods firms
enjoy some monopoly power in producing a differentiated product. They face a downward sloping
demand curve, (2.6), but are also subject to Rotemberg (1982) quadratic-adjustment costs in
changing prices of the form, φ2
(
pt(i)
pt−1(i)
1
pi∗ − 1
)2
PtYt. Therefore, large price changes in excess of
steady-state inflation rates are particularly costly, possibly as a result of customer dissatisfaction.
The quadratic price adjustment costs renders the firm’s problem dynamic,
max
∞∑
t=0
R0,t
(
pt(i)yt(i)−mctPtyt(i)− φ
2
(
pt(i)
pt−1(i)
1
pi∗
− 1
)2
PtYt
)
(2.8)
s.t. yt(i) =
(
pt(i)
Pt
)−θ
Yt (2.9)
where mct = wt/At is the real marginal cost implied by a linear production function, yt(i) =
Atnt(i). Productivity, At is common to all firms and follows an AR(1) process:
log
At
A∗
= ρA
At−1
A∗
+ εAt ε
A
t ∼ i.i.d.N (0, σ2A)
The first-order condition, after imposing symmetry across firms, is,
(1− θ) + θmct − φ
( pit
pi∗
− 1
) pit
pi∗
+ βφEt
uc(t+ 1)
uc(t)
(pit+1
pi∗
− 1
) pit+1
pi∗
Yt+1
Yt
= 0.
which represents the non-linear New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) under Rotemberg pricing
and which would, upon linearization, correspond to the standard NKPC under Calvo (1983) pricing.
The associated monopoly profit, which is taxed by the government when received by households,
is,
Υt = Yt −mctYt − φ
2
( pit
pi∗
− 1
)2
Yt. (2.10)
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2.4 Government Combining the households’ budget constraints and noting the equivalence
between factor incomes and national output allows us to derive the government budget constraint.
Bt
Rt
+ τt (Wtnt + Υt) = (1− δt)Bt−1 + Ptgt + Ptzt (2.11)
In our model, default is costless in the sense that the defaulting government is neither forced
to reform its policies by dramatically reducing deficits nor is it locked out of credit markets for
some period. While fiscal policy changes in the form of tax, transfers and government spending
will obviously affect debt dynamics, monetary policy and risk premia will also have a role to play,
especially when debt stocks are large and the economy approaches its fiscal limit. The government’s
budget constraint can be rewritten in terms of real variables:
bt−1
1− δt
pit
=
bt
Rt
+ Tt − gt − zt
where bt is real government debt. zt is assumed to be fixed and gt follows an AR(1) process:
log
gt
g∗
= ρg
gt−1
g∗
+ εgt ε
g
t ∼ i.i.d.N (0, σ2g) (2.12)
We assume that fiscal and monetary policy follow simple rules of the form,
τt − τ∗ = γτ (bdt − b∗) (2.13)
Rit −R∗ = α(pit − pi∗) + εRt εRt ∼ i.i.d.N (0, σ2R) (2.14)
where bdt = (1 − δt)bt−1. The interest rate rule is defined in terms of Rit, which represents either
the interest rate containing default risk premia, Rt, or the risk-free rate of interest, R
f
t . Schabert
(2010), Uribe (2006), and Matveev (2012) all consider a monetary policy rule defined in terms of
the interest rate on risky government bonds, which we shall show in the next section amounts to
accommodating default risk by effectively raising the inflation target, cet. par..
2.5 Aggregate Resource The aggregate resource constraint is
ct + gt = Atnt
(
1− φ
2
( pit
pi∗
− 1
)2)
(2.15)
In the aggregate, deviations of inflation from target generate real resource costs.
3 Simple Analytics: Default and Inflation
This section uses a simple analytical model to describe the link between default and inflation.
Consistent with the economy described in section 2, we assume that monetary policy is active
and fiscal policy is passive. This policy combination makes the linkages between inflation and
default quite different from those described in Uribe (2006), who considers a similar economy, but
5
assumes that fiscal policy does not seek to stabilize government debt. In our setup, depending on
the specification of the monetary rule, default may make it difficult for the monetary authority to
hit its inflation target even if monetary policy actively targets inflation and fiscal policy passively
adjusts surpluses to stabilize debt.
Consider a constant endowment, cashless economy in which the equilibrium real interest rate,
1/β is also constant. Government default is the sole source of uncertainty and for current purposes,
the decision to default by the fraction δt ∈ [0, 1] on outstanding debt carried into period t is
exogenous and follows a known stochastic process. Let Rt be the gross risky rate of return on
nominal government debt and pit = Pt/Pt−1 be the inflation rate. Household optimization yields
the Fisher relation
1
Rt
= βEt
[
1− δt+1
pit+1
]
(3.1)
while trade in risk-free bonds (assumed to be in zero net supply) gives an analogous relation for
the risk-free interest rate, Rft ,
1
Rft
= βEt
[
1
pit+1
]
(3.2)
The government’s budget constraint is
Bt
Pt
+ st =
(1− δt)
pit
Rt−1
Bt−1
Pt−1
(3.3)
where st is the primary surplus. Write this constraint at t + 1, take expectations conditional on
information at t, impose the Euler equation β−1 = Et(1 − δt+1)Rt/pit+1, and solve for Bt/Pt to
yield
Bt
Pt
= βEt
Bt+1
Pt+1
+ βEtst+1 (3.4)
When the real interest rate is fixed, both the nominal rate and the inflation rate reflect default,
so that the expected default rate drops out once expectations are taken. This implies that only
surprises in default directly affect the evolution of real government debt in this flexible-price en-
dowment economy. In light of this, we obtain, by iterating on (3.4) and imposing the household’s
transversality condition
Bt
Pt
=
∞∑
j=1
βjEtst+j (3.5)
Expression (3.5) is the usual intertemporal equilibrium condition that equates the value of govern-
ment debt to the expected present value of “cash flows,” which are primary surpluses.
Fiscal policy sets the surplus in order to stabilize the post-default value of government debt
st − s∗ = γ
[
(1− δt)Bt−1
Pt−1
− b∗
]
(3.6)
where s∗ and b∗ are target and steady state values for the surplus and real debt, and bt−1 =
Bt−1/Pt−1. Substituting (3.6) into (3.3) and taking expectations at time t yields the evolution of
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expected debt
Etbt+1 + (s
∗ − γb∗) = [β−1 − γ(1− Etδt+1)]bt (3.7)
One result that emerges immediately from (3.7) is that stability of the debt process in the face of
debt default requires that
γ >
β−1 − 1
1− Etδt+1 (3.8)
a condition that potentially is far more demanding than the usual one that γ > β−1−1, particularly
when substantial default rates are possible. Provided this condition is fulfilled, however, fiscal policy
remains passive and capable of stabilizing the real value of government debt.
When specifying monetary policy behavior, we must choose which interest rate to adopt in
defining the policy rule. If the central bank targets the risk-free rate, then the monetary policy
rule is,2
1
Rft
=
1
R∗
+ α
(
1
pit
− 1
pi∗
)
(3.9)
Combining the policy rule with the Fisher relation, (3.2), yields the dynamic equation for inflation
1
pit
− 1
pi∗
=
β
α
Et
(
1
pit+1
− 1
pi∗
)
(3.10)
which implies monetary policy hits its target inflation rate, provided the policy behavior is suffi-
ciently active, β/α < 1.3 Although default can weaken the passivity of a fiscal rule defined in terms
of the post-default level of debt, provided it satisfies (3.8), fiscal policy remains passive, and an
active monetary policy can successfully target inflation when the central bank’s instrument is the
risk-free nominal rate.
If the central bank targets the risky interest rate, the monetary policy rule becomes
1
Rt
=
1
R∗
+ α
(
1
pit
− 1
pi∗
)
(3.11)
This is our benchmark case, following Uribe (2006) and Schabert (2010). Monetary policy aims to
stabilize inflation by setting α/β > 1. In defining this rule we are not saying that the policy maker
has direct control over this rate as a policy instrument, but that through open market operations
it adjusts the policy rate to achieve this relationship between the rate of return on government
bonds and inflation. In the transmission from the very short-term rates targeted through open
market operations to the wider economy and ultimately inflation, the central bank would expect
to see a significant degree of pass through to the contractual interest rates employed throughout
the economy.4
2The monetary policy rule is written in terms of 1
Rt
instead of Rt in order to obtain a closed-form solution without
linearizing the model. Upon linearization this would be isomorphic with more standard representations of the Taylor
rule.
3In this paper, we restrict attention to locally bounded solutions, recognizing the argument in Cochrane (2011)
that there are a continuum of explosive solutions to expressions like (3.10).
4Empirical evidence suggests that the rate at which policy interest rates pass through to bank interest rates is
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In this case, default influences the ability of the monetary authority to target inflation, even
if fiscal policy remains passive and monetary policy is active. To see this, combine the monetary
policy rule in (3.11) with the Fisher relation to yield the dynamic equation for inflation
1
pit
− 1
pi∗
=
β
α
Et
(
1− δt+1
pit+1
− 1
pi∗
)
(3.12)
which now depends on the expected default rate. Active monetary policy implies that the unique
locally bounded solution for inflation is
1
pit
=
1
pi∗
(
1− β
α
)1 + Et
∞∑
i=1
(
β
α
)i i∏
j=1
(1− δt+j)
 (3.13)
In the absence of default, δt ≡ 0, monetary policy achieves its inflation target exactly, pit = pi∗.
Higher expected default rates in the future raise current inflation. The farther into the future
default is expected, the more it is discounted by β/α < 1, and the smaller is its impact on inflation
at time t.
Consider a stylized experiment. At time t news arrives that raises the expected default rate at
t + 1, Etδt+1 > 0, but all subsequent expected default rates are zero, Etδt+j = 0 for j > 1. Then
(3.13) reduces to
pit = pi
∗
[
1
1− βαEt(δt+1)
]
> pi∗ (3.14)
We see that higher expected default raises inflation, but the extent to which it does so is mitigated
by a more aggressive monetary response to inflation in the form of a higher α.
If the default rate is constant, δt ≡ δ ∈ [0, 1], then more aggressive monetary policy enhances
the central bank’s control of inflation. A constant default rate yields the solution for inflation
pit = pi
∗
[
1− (1− δ)βα
1− βα
]
(3.15)
so that pit → pi∗ as α→∞. Again, a more aggressive monetary policy response to inflation reduces
the inflationary consequences of default. This simple example with a constant default rate is also
useful in illustrating why a monetary rule with risk-free rate, coupled with a passive fiscal policy,
can successfully target inflation, while a rule with risky rate can’t. Rewrite (3.11) in terms of the
risk-free rate as
1
Rft
=
1
R∗
+
α
1− δ
[
1
pit
−
(
1
pi∗
− δ
αR∗
)]
(3.16)
The monetary policy rules defined in terms of the risky rate of interest can be transformed into
a rule of the same form as that defined in terms of the risk-free rate, but with two important
quite high—about 90 percent within a quarter [Gambacorta (2008)]. We are implicitly assuming similarly high rates
of pass through to government bond yields.
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differences. First, default does not make monetary policy less active; in fact, it raises the coefficient
on excess inflation, α1−δ > α. Second, default raises the effective inflation target from pi
∗ to pi
∗
1−δβ/α .
Intuitively, a higher rate of default creates partial monetary policy accommodation: in the
presence of default, the monetary authority must allow the risky rate of interest to rise to induce
bondholders to continue holding the stock of government bonds. Given the monetary policy rule, the
monetary authority will not raise interest rates without a rise in inflation. Bondholders attempt to
sell bonds and increase their consumption paths, which pushes up the price level until bondholders
are being compensated for their default risk and inflation and interest rates are consistent with the
monetary rule. Stronger responsiveness of policy to inflation, higher α, reduces the effective rise
in the inflation target needed to achieve the rise in interest rates desired by bondholders. Another
perspective on default is that higher expected default reduces the desirability of holding bonds,
increasing aggregate demand. Higher demand drives up inflation. The central bank reacts to
inflation by raising the risky nominal interest rate on government bonds.
As a general proposition, the possibility of default can undermine the central bank’s control of
inflation: there is a tight connection between expected default rates and inflation in our model, as in
Uribe (2006), but the mechanism differs from Uribe’s. Uribe obtains his result through a standard
fiscal theory of the price level mechanism by coupling an active monetary policy rule like (3.11) with
an active fiscal rule akin to setting γ = 0 in (3.6), just as in Loyo (1999) and, more recently, Sims
(2011). Those analyses highlight that a tight monetary policy can ultimately generate a worsening
inflation situation if fiscal policy does not adjust to stabilize government debt. In contrast, our
results stem from the monetary policy response to default, even though the monetary policy rule
remains active and fiscal policy passive. Putting it differently, although we also find a positive link
between default and inflation, that link differs in crucial aspects. For example, in Uribe (2006)
delaying default supports unstable inflation dynamics for longer, making it more difficult for the
monetary authorities to hit their inflation target. In our active monetary/passive fiscal regime,
though, the impact of future default on prices is discounted so that delaying default reduces the
immediate inflationary consequences of default. Furthermore, in Uribe (2006) raising α and making
monetary policy more active further destabilizes inflation dynamics and moves the economy farther
from its inflation target. More active monetary policy in our environment reduces deviations from
the inflation target due to default.
4 Quantitative Analysis
The simple model in section 3 illustrates that the specification of the monetary policy rule—risky
versus risk-free nominal rate—matters for the inflation consequences of sovereign default risk and
the ability of active monetary policy to target inflation in the face of such risk. In the rest of this
paper, we explore the quantitative impact of this channel. To start, we first explain how to model
sovereign default via fiscal limits.
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4.1 Fiscal Limits Fiscal limits are defined, following Bi (2012), as the maximum expected
present value of future primary surpluses. Laffer curves provide a natural starting point for quanti-
fying the fiscal limit from the tax revenue side of the government’s budget constraint. At the peak
of the Laffer curve, tax revenues reach their maximum and, given some minimum level of total
government expenditures, the expected present value of primary surpluses and, therefore, the value
of government debt, are maximized. Revenues, expenditures, and discount rates, of course, vary
with the shocks hitting the economy, generating a distribution for the maximum debt-GDP level
that can be supported.
Laffer Curve Assume the utility function is u(ct, nt) = log ct+χN log(1−nt). Labor supply can
be solved analytically as a function of (τt, pit, At, gt) using the first-order conditions. Work effort is
given by
nt =
wtX1,t + χngt
wtX1,t + χnX2,t
(4.1)
with X1,t = 1− τt (4.2)
X2,t = At
(
1− φ
2
( pit
pi∗
− 1
)2)
(4.3)
Total tax revenue is
Tt = (wtnt + Υt) τt
= Atntτt
(
1− φ
2
( pit
pi∗
− 1
)2)
. (4.4)
When the monetary authority keeps the inflation rate at its target (pit = pi
∗) and transfers are
at their steady-state level (zt = z
∗), the peak of the Laffer curve is a function only of the exogenous
state of the economy (At, gt).
τmaxt = τ
max(At, gt) (4.5)
Tmaxt = T max(At, gt) (4.6)
Evidently, the stochastic processes governing the exogenous states induce stochastic processes for
both the tax rate that maximizes revenues and the level of revenues.
Computing Fiscal Limit Importantly, the notion of a fiscal limit that we develop is the private
sector’s perception of the limit.
B∗ ∼
∞∑
t=0
βt βpt︸︷︷︸
political factor
umaxc (At, gt)
umaxc (A0, g0)
(T max(At, gt)− gt − z) (4.7)
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Calculation of the fiscal limit uses the stochastic discount factor that obtains when tax rates are
at the peak of the Laffer curve, βtumaxc (At, gt)/u
max
c (A0, g0), but modified to allow for a regime-
switching political risk parameter βpt ∈
{
βpL, β
p
H
}
with transition matrix of
[
pLL 1− pLL
1− pHH pHH
]
.
Higher political risk—lower βpt —lends itself to multiple interpretations that reflect the private
sector’s beliefs about policy. Most straightforward is the idea that policymakers are believed to
have effectively shorter planning horizons than the private sector [see, for example, Acemoglu et al.
(2008)]. To see this, rewrite the discount factor in (4.7) as (βpβ)t/(βp)t−1, so that a lower value
of βp reduces the present value of maximum surpluses. An alternative interpretation is that a
lower βp implies that private agents place probability mass on both the maximum surpluses, smax
reflected in (4.7), and on surpluses being zero. Rewrite the surpluses as βpsmax + (1 − βp) · 0 for
this interpretation.
Nothing we do hinges on the precise interpretation attached to βp. As a practical matter,
setting βp < 1 serves to shift down the distribution of the fiscal limit, which generates risk premia
at lower levels of debt as observed in data. Uncertainty about βp generated by treating it as a
Markov process increases the dispersion of the fiscal limit, which also seems important for generating
plausible movements in risk premia.
Since there exists a unique mapping between the exogenous state space, (At, gt), to τ
max
t and
Tmaxt , the unconditional distribution of the fiscal limit, f(B∗), can be derived from a Markov Chain
Monte Carlo simulation following the steps that appendix C describes.
The government adopts a fixed-rate default rule. At each date, an effective fiscal limit, Bt, is
drawn from the normal density depicted in figure 1, given by N (B¯∗, σ2B). Government defaults on a
fraction, δt, of outstanding debt according to the rule (4.8), below. If the real value of debt at the
beginning of period t, bt−1, exceeds the effective fiscal limit, then the government partially defaults
and debt outstanding at the beginning of period t becomes bdt = (1− δ)bt−1.
δt =
δ if bt−1 > Bt (Above Effective Fiscal Limit)0 if bt−1 ≤ Bt (Below Effective Fiscal Limit) (4.8)
The choice of Bt, which we treat as random, is determined by political considerations that are
driven by the policymakers’ assessments of the costs associated with fully meeting the country’s
debt obligations.
Interpretation The fiscal limit describes the stochastic upper bound on how much government
debt the economy can support given the economic and political constraints. Policy rules that make
fiscal instruments react strongly enough to the state of government indebtedness serve to anchor
fiscal expectations. Rather than making the default decision a strategic choice of an optimizing gov-
ernment, we opt to treat the intrinsically political decision as a random draw from the distribution
of fiscal limits.
Although the theoretical analysis of fiscal policy in developed countries has largely abstracted
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from sovereign default risk, there are some exceptions. Uribe (2006) analyzes a flexible price model
in which sovereign default is inevitable, as the central bank targets the price level and the fiscal
authority maintains a constant tax rate. By setting an ad-hoc and fixed default threshold, he shows
how the default scheme affects equilibrium dynamics. Similarly, Daniel and Shiamptanis (2012)
assume government debt is constrained by an ad-hoc fiscal limit to study a small open economy
in a monetary union under alternative fiscal policy responses to a fiscal crisis. Instead of modeling
sovereign default explicitly, Corsetti et al. (2013) assume that the risk premium on government
debt depends on the expected level of government debt, as in Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010). Corsetti
et al. (2013) show how the timing of fiscal retrenchment and the size of the risk premium affect
economic outcomes at the zero lower bound for nominal interest rates.
4.2 Calibration The model is calibrated at a quarterly frequency. The household discount rate
is 0.99. The utility function is assumed to be u(c, L) = log c+ χ log(1− n). The leisure preference
parameter, χ, is calibrated in such a way that the household spends 25 percent of its time working
and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is 3. Time endowment and the productivity level at the
steady state are normalized to 1.
Parameterizations of the shock processes for At and gt follow the literature. For instance,
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007) assume ρA to be 0.8556, σA to be 0.0064, ρg to be 0.87, and σg
to be 0.016. The price elasticity of demand, θ, is assumed to be 11 and the Rotemberg adjustment
parameter, φ, is 100, which implies that 26.7 percent of the firms reoptimize each quarter [see Keen
and Wang (2007)]. The gross inflation rate is calibrated to 1.03 at annual rate and the Taylor rule
parameter is assumed to be 2.5. As explained in section 3, a higher Taylor rule parameter is needed
when the haircut δ is sizable.5
The fiscal parameters are roughly calibrated to match Greek data from 1971 to 2007. In steady
state, government purchases are 16.7 percent of GDP, lump-sum transfers are 13.34 percent of GDP,
and tax rate is 0.315.6 The tax adjustment parameter, γ, is calibrated to 0.75 at annual rate. The
default rate, δ, is assumed to 0.05, implying 20 percent annual default rate. We use a relatively small
default rate to underscore that even small rates can generate quantitatively important effects.7
The International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) index of political risk offers one way to calibrate
the political factor, βp [see Arteta and Galina (2008)]. The ICRG index of political risk for Greece
appears to follow a regime-switching process. It stayed low and stable during the period between
1984 and 1993, then rose to a higher level between 1994 and 1996, and stayed at the high level until
the financial crisis erupted in 2008. In this model, we calibrate βpt to be a two-state symmetric
Markov regime-switching process. The low state, βpL, is calibrated to 0.4 and the high state,
5Appendix A provides more details on determinacy conditions.
6The government debt is 35.26 percent of GDP at steady state, which is slightly lower than 40 percent, the average
share of government debt over the GDP in Greece.
7Significantly higher values for δ tend to cause stability problems in the model. Risk premia depend on current
and expected default rates. Substantially higher default rates would drive risk premia and inflation much higher.
With Rotemberg (1982) costs to price adjustment, spikes in inflation carry real resource costs that, if too large, can
actually make cost-adjusted output negative.
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Parameter Calibration
Discount factor β 0.99
Elasticity of substitution θ 11
Rotemberg adjustment parameter φ 100
Inflation rate pi∗ 1.03 (annual)
Labor supply n∗ 0.25
Government spending-GDP g∗/y∗ 0.167
Government transfer-GDP z∗/y∗ 0.134
Tax rate τ∗ 0.315
Fiscal rule parameter γτ 0.5/4
Default rate δ 0.05 (20% annually)
Taylor rule parameter α 2.5
Technology A∗ 1
Technology shock persistence ρA 0.85
Technology shock variance σ2A 0.01
2
Monetary shock variance σ2R 0.005
2
Fiscal shock persistence ρg 0.85
Fiscal shock variance σ2g 0.015
2
Political factor (Low) βpL 0.4
Political factor (High) βpH 0.6
Political factor transition matrix pLL 0.9
pHH 0.9
Fiscal limit B¯∗ 1.5
Fiscal limit variance σ2b 0.0739
2
Table 1: Model Calibration
βpH , is 0.6. We assume that the probability of switching between the two states is 0.1. Under
the calibration in table 1, the distribution of the fiscal limit has B¯∗ = 1.5 (150 percent of GDP
annually) and σb = 0.0739, shown in figure 1.
We solve the full non-linear model laid out in section 2, coupled with the fiscal limit described
in section 4.1, using the monotone map method, which discretizes the state space and finds fixed
points in the space of decision rules. Details appear in appendix D.
4.3 Policy Effects We examine how the impact of monetary policy shocks change when the
economy moves from being far from its fiscal limit to within striking distance of the limit. Several
European countries operated at or near their fiscal limits during the European debt crisis. The set
of experiments in this section addresses precisely this situation by tracing out the impacts of an
exogenous monetary contraction. We explore two types of monetary policy rules that are defined
in terms of either risky or risk-free nominal rates.
4.3.1 Taylor Rule with Risky Rate Monetary and fiscal policy always must interact in
specific ways to ensure that a unique equilibrium exists. When monetary policy targets inflation,
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even when there is no possibility of default, a monetary contraction engineered through an open-
market sale of bonds increases the public’s bond holdings, raises nominal and real interest rates,
and requires expected surpluses to rise. Higher outstanding debt and higher interest rates raise
debt service. To prevent debt from exploding, fiscal policy must raise future taxes or reduce future
non-interest spending. These interactions permit the monetary contraction to reduce inflation and
economic activity.
The possibility of debt default adds further complications to the interactions—complications
that can dramatically alter the effects of monetary policy. A monetary policy contraction triggers
three distinct sources of dynamics: those produced by the initial increase in the policy interest rate
itself; the intrinsic dynamics that arise when debt is well above its steady state level, as even in the
absence of default the dynamics following a monetary contraction may be different at high levels
of debt than at low levels; the additional dynamics that stem from changes in the probability of
default and the risk premium on sovereign debt.
This sub-section assumes the central bank’s policy rule is defined in terms of the risky nominal
interest rate. Consider an i.i.d. contractionary monetary policy disturbance that raises the nominal
interest rate by 2 percentage points at an annual rate. When the economy is at its steady state
and the probability of default is nil, the contraction has the usual effects: nominal and real interest
rates rise only in the period of the shock; output, inflation and wages fall initially.
The contraction in the tax base this implies raises debt; bringing forth higher tax rates, which
keep output persistently below steady state while debt is stabilized. These latter effects will be
exacerbated when debt levels are high, even in the absence of default. Additionally, the higher
tax rates employed to stabilize debt serve to raise marginal costs and fuel inflation, resulting in
a monetary policy response. We can see the impact of this additional channel of monetary and
fiscal policy interaction by contrasting the response to the monetary policy shock at high and low
debt levels. Figure 2 shows that the intrinsic dynamics associated with debt being far from steady
state show up primarily through chronically higher debt and tax rates, which allow a monetary
contraction to have persistent negative effects on output.
The third layer of dynamics is triggered by the possibility of debt default. To isolate the effects of
default, figure 3 reports the difference that allowing for default makes to the time paths of variables
when debt is near the fiscal limit and there is no monetary policy shock. This marginal effect of
default is computed by solving the model first with the default rule in expression (4.8), then with
δt ≡ 0, and calculating the difference in the time paths from these two solutions, conditional on debt
being near the fiscal limit. Government debt near the fiscal limit creates a probability of default,
which produces a risk premium in real bond yields. Higher real rates raise debt service, which
further increases debt and actual tax rates, as dictated by the tax rule in (2.13). Higher realized
tax rates reduce hours worked and consumption. Inflation, and through the active monetary policy
rule, nominal interest rates rise. This is the same phenomenon highlighted in the analytics of
section 3.
Pulling all these dynamics together we obtain the overall effect of a monetary contraction when
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debt default is permitted. Figure 4 reports time paths following a serially uncorrelated monetary
contraction, contrasting those when the economy is far from the fiscal limit—dashed lines—to those
when the economy is staring at the limit—solid lines. Away from the limit, tighter monetary policy
has the usual effects because the probability of debt default is essentially zero. As the debt level is
close to fiscal limits, monetary contraction barely lowers inflation even in the very short run, and
soon the impact of expected default dominates and inflation rises dramatically and persistently.
The effects of higher debt service manifest in sharply higher debt, which brings with it higher tax
rates and persistently lower output.
4.3.2 Taylor Rule with Risk-Free Rate Analytics in section 3 made clear the importance
of the instrument the central bank is assumed to target. Here we repeat the monetary contraction
experiment of section 4.3.1, but now assume that the central bank sets the risk-free interest rate,
Rft , according to a Taylor rule.
Analytical results suggest that the increase in inflation observed in figure 4 when monetary
policy targets the risky interest rate, may no longer occur once it is the risk-free interest rate
the monetary authority focuses on. Figure 5 confirms that the analytical result holds in the new
Keynesian model – the specification of monetary policy rule is a critical step in determining the
inflationary consequences of sovereign debt risk. The figure overlays results when the risk-free
interest rate enters the Taylor rule with those from figure 4 for the risky interest rate.
When government debt is far from the fiscal limit and the probability of default is nil, there is
no distinction between the risk-free and the risky rates, and the impacts of a monetary contraction
are identical. Near the fiscal limit, however, when monetary policy adjusts the risk-free rate it
combats inflation without accommodating increases in default probabilities. As a result, there is
no tendency for inflation to rise, but policy ends up raising the real interest rate a lot more (dotted-
dashed lines). Output contracts for a prolonged period of time following persistently higher debt
and taxes. The striking comparison between the two cases with different interest rate instruments
highlights that sovereign default risk put into sharp relief the tradeoff between inflation and output
stabilization.
5 Concluding Remarks
While central banks may stress that they are solely concerned with the medium-term stabilization of
inflation, there are reasons to expect that they have incentives to, at least partially, accommodate
any rise in sovereign default risk. We contrast such a description of monetary policy with an
alternative where the central bank defines their policy rule in terms of the risk-free rate.
At low levels of debt, sovereign default is a distant possibility and the response to a monetary
contraction under these two descriptions of policy is very similar and entirely conventional - a fall
in inflation and output for as long as the monetary contraction persists. At higher debt levels,
however, the policy response to a monetary contraction is quite different. The tightening of policy
worsens debt dynamics, prompting a sustained rise in distortionary taxation in an attempt to
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stabilise that debt. This dynamics extends the impact of the monetary contraction well beyond
the date of the initial shock. When the policy rule is defined in terms of the risk free rate, central
bank tightens policy to offset the rise in inflation, resulting in output bearing the brunt of the
macroeconomic cost of the ongoing fiscal adjustment. In contrast, if central bank targets the risky
rate on government debt, the worsening debt dynamics raise default risk; by accommodating that
risk the central bank implicitly amounts to a relaxation in the inflation target. Inflation rises
significantly even although the initial shock driving this process was a monetary contraction. This
analysis suggests that the monetary policy transmission mechanism is likely to be quite different
in low and high debt environments, crucially depending on the central bank’s attitude towards
containing any emerging sovereign default risk premia. While the possibility that banks are too big
to fail may give rise to expectations of bailouts at low debt levels, at higher debt levels economic
agents may anticipate that the sovereign debt-banking crisis nexus is too important for the central
bank not to accommodate.
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A Simple Analytics: Default and Determinacy
This section examines the implications of default for the determinacy of equilibrium in a simplified
version of the baseline model in section 2. To derive analytical results, we assume that government
spending and transfers are zero, and taxes are lumpsum. We also assume there is an exogenous and
constant rate of default every period, δt ≡ δ ∈ [0, 1]. Varying this fixed default rate only affects the
dynamics of our system if it affects the steady state of the system, and it only does that through
the monetary policy rule. As noted above, in the presence of default, it is as if the inflation target
has risen from
pi∗ to p¯i∗ ≡ pi
∗
1− δβ/α (A.1)
This implies that as we approach the fiscal limit, default risk premia emerge and, given the speci-
fication of the interest rate rule with risky rate, this leads to monetary accommodation of default
risk that is effectively the same as raising the inflation target. We now explore the implications for
determinacy of increasing the fixed default rate, which raises risk premia.
Appendix B details the log-linearization of our dynamic system. The appendix shows that the
dynamic system can be written as Etpit+1Etŷt+1
b̂t
 =

φ1
βφ2
− φ3βφ2 0
γ2 − γ1 φ1βφ2 1 +
γ1φ3
βφ2
0
β−1(αβ − 1) 0 β−1(1− γp¯i∗)

 pitŷt
b̂t−1

where a hat denotes the percentage deviation of that variable from its steady-state value, φi > 0
for i = 1, 2, 3 are bundles of parameters contained in the new Keynesian Phillips curve defined in
the appendix. The other parameter bundles are found in the consumption-Euler equation and are
defined as
γ1 = 1− φ(p¯i∗ − 1)y
∗
c∗
γ2 = α− φ(p¯i∗ − 1)y
∗
c∗
where φ ≥ 0 determines the costs of adjustment in Rotemberg (1982) pricing. Parameters γ1 and
γ2 are positive unless default raises inflation to such an extent that the second term dominates the
first in either definition.
Since taxes are lump-sum, the debt dynamics are decoupled from the dynamics of the rest of
the system. Debt will be dynamically stable if
β−1(1− γp¯i∗) < 1
which requires
γ >
(1− β)
p¯i∗
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Fiscal policy must passively raise lump-sum taxes by more than debt service costs in order to
stabilize the debt.
We can now set aside debt dynamics to analyze the determinacy of the rest of the dynamic
system. This part of the system can be represented as[
Etpit+1
Etŷt+1
]
=
[
β˜−1 −β˜−1κ
γ1(γ˜2 − β˜−1) 1 + γ1β˜−1κ
][
pit
ŷt
]
where
β˜−1 =
φ1
βφ2
, κ =
φ3
φ1
, γ˜2 =
γ2
γ1
which is in exactly the same form as the model considered in Woodford (2003, p. 677).
Consider the trace of the transition matrix
trA = 1 + β˜−1(1 + κγ1)
and determinant
detA = β˜−1(1 + γ2κ)
which imply
detA− trA = β˜−1(1 + γ2κ)− 1− β˜−1(1 + κγ1)
= β˜−1κ(α− 1)− 1
and
detA+ trA = β˜−1(1 + γ2κ) + 1 + β˜−1(1 + κγ1)
= β˜−1(2 + (γ1 + γ2)κ) + 1
The following set of determinacy conditions in Woodford (2003, p. 677) are relevant for our model,
detA > 1
detA− trA > −1
detA+ trA > −1
Provided all parameter bundles are positive, it is only the second condition that bites, requiring
γ˜2 =
α− φ(p¯i∗ − 1)y∗c∗
1− φ(p¯i∗ − 1)y∗c∗
> 1
This reduces to the usual Taylor principle: α > 1. Therefore, provided default rates are not
too high, the usual combination of active monetary policy and passive fiscal policy will ensure
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determinacy of our sticky-price economy.
As steady-state inflation rises—as a result of steady-state increases in the default rate, δ—the
parameter combinations γ1 and γ2 can turn negative, and may overturn the necessary conditions
for stability and imply indeterminacy. Notice that detA − trA > −1 irrespective of the steady-
state rates of default and inflation, so the conditions outlined above remain the relevant case for
determinacy. The other conditions for determinacy may be breached when
γ2 = α− φ(p¯i
∗ − 1)
1− φ2 (p¯i∗ − 1)2
<
β˜ − 1
κ
or when
γ1 + γ2 = 1 + α− 2φ(p¯i
∗ − 1)
1− φ2 (p¯i∗ − 1)2
< −2
κ
either of which may occur for an active interest rate rule and a high enough default rate. In other
words, when we move to our sticky price economy, at high default rates the accommodation of risk
premia through rising inflation can result in the backward bending of the Phillips curve detailed in
Ascari and Ropele (2005), which can render a standard active/passive policy mix indeterminate.
Finally, we note that this indeterminacy arising from default is different from that reported
in Schabert (2010). By assuming that the government exogenously imposes a default rate (which
applies at every period in this simplified model, but applies only upon hitting the fiscal limit
in the baseline model in section 2) we circumvent the indeterminacy that arises when the rate
of default, δt, is endogenously determined by the need to satisfy the government’s intertemporal
budget constraint. Uribe (2006) similarly avoids indeterminacy by imposing a default rate which
ensures the inflation target holds. Instead, the potential indeterminacy we have identified, comes
from the resource costs of rising inflation in a sticky-price economy, where default results in a
monetary accommodation that raises inflation.
This section has shown that a monetary policy rule with risky rate, which implicitly raises
the inflation target in the presence of default risk, can induce indeterminacy if the default rate
is sufficiently high. However, for the rates of default considered upon hitting the fiscal limit in
the main body of the paper, the model remains locally determinate for the policy rule parameters
adopted.
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B Log-Linearized System
The log-linearized system includes:
cˆt =
c∗ + g∗
c∗
yˆt − φ(pi∗ − 1)y
∗
c∗
pˆit (B.1)
wˆt =
n∗
1− n∗
(
yˆt − Aˆt
)
+
c∗ + g∗
c∗
yˆt − φ(pi∗ − 1)y
∗
c∗
pˆit +
τ∗
1− τ∗ τ̂t (B.2)
Rˆt = Et (cˆt+1 + pˆit+1)− cˆt + Et δ
1− δ δˆt+1 (B.3)
− δ
1− δ δˆt + b̂t−1 − pˆit = βb̂t + (1− β)T̂t − βR̂t (B.4)
θ
w∗
A∗
(
wˆt − Aˆt
)
− φ(pi∗ − 1)pˆit − φpi∗pˆit (B.5)
+ βφ(pi∗ − 1)piEt (cˆt − cˆt+1 + yˆt+1 − yˆt) + βφ(2pi∗ − 1)Etpˆit+1 = 0
If taxes are distortionary and applied to labour income and monopoly profits, then
Tt = τtyt(1− φ
2
(pit − 1)2)
which log-linearizes as
T̂t = τ̂t + ŷt − φ(pi∗ − 1)yτ
T
pˆit
In this case our log-linearized fiscal rule is given by
τ̂t = γb̂t−1
while if taxes are lump-sum, τ̂t = 0, and the fiscal rule is
Tt − T ∗ = γ((1− δt)bt−1 − b∗)
and total tax revenues log-linearize as
T̂t =
γpi∗
(1− β) b̂t−1
In conjunction with the log-linearized monetary policy rule
R̂t = αpit
these conditions can be combined to yield the dynamic systems described in the text.
C Simulating the Fiscal Limit
The fiscal limit B∗ can be obtained using Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation:
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• First, for each simulation, we randomly draw the shocks of political factor, productivity and
government purchases for 1000 periods. Assuming that the tax rate is always at the peak of
the dynamic Laffer curves, we compute the paths of all other variables using the household
first-order conditions and the budget constraints. According to equation 4.7, we compute
the discounted sum of maximum fiscal surplus by discarding the first 200 draws as a burn-in
period.
• Second, we repeat the simulation for 100, 000 times and obtain the distribution of the fiscal
limit, which is then approximated to a normal distribution N (b∗, σ2b ).
• At each period of time, the effective fiscal limit b∗t is a random draw from the distribution.
D Solving the Non-Linear Model
Following the household first-order conditions, the labor supply and consumption can be solved in
terms of (wt, τt, pit, At, gt):
nt =
wtX1,t + χngt
wtX1,t + χnX2,t
(D.1)
ct = X2,tnt − gt (D.2)
with X1,t = 1− τt (D.3)
X2,t = At
(
1− φ
2
( pit
pi∗
− 1
)2)
(D.4)
The complete model also consists of the following non-linear equations:
(1− θ) + θwt
At
= φ
( pit
pi∗
− 1
) pit
pi∗
− βφEtuc(t+ 1)
uc(t)
(pit+1
pi∗
− 1
) pit+1
pi∗
Yt+1
Yt
(D.5)
Yt = Atnt (D.6)
Υt = Yt − wt
At
Yt − φ
2
( pit
pi∗
− 1
)2
Yt (D.7)
bt−1
1− δt
pit
=
bt
Rt
+ τt(wtnt + Υt)− gt − z∗ (D.8)
τt − τ∗ = γτ (bdt − b∗) (D.9)
Rit −R∗ = α(pit − pi∗) + εRt (D.10)
log
gt
g∗
= ρg
gt−1
g∗
+ εgt (D.11)
log
At
A∗
= ρA
At−1
A∗
+ εAt (D.12)
The solution method, based on Coleman (1991) and Davig (2004), conjectures candidate decision
rules that reduce the system to a set of expectation first-order difference equations. In this model,
the decision rule maps the state at period t into the stock of government debt, the real wage,
and the inflation rate in the same period. The state is denoted as ψt =
{
bdt , At, gt
}
, while the
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mapping is denoted as bt = f
b(ψt), wt = f
w(ψt), pit = f
pi(ψt). The state variable of the post-default
government liability (bdt ) incorporates the information of the effective fiscal limit at time t (b
∗
t ) and
the pre-default government liability (bt−1).
The conjectured rules can be substituted into the non-linear system, in which the expectation
terms are evaluated using a numerical quadrature. The model is solved for each set of state variables
defined over a discrete partition of the state space. The decision rules are updated at every node
of the state space. The procedure is repeated until the iterations update the current decision rules
by less than some  > 0 (set to 1e− 6).
After finding the decision rules, we can solve the pricing rule (qt = f
q(ψt)) using the government
budget constraint. The interest rate on government bonds can also be solved using Rt = 1/qt,
denoted as fR(ψt).
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Figure 1: Distribution of the fiscal limit as computed from the expression for B∗ in (4.7).
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Figure 2: Impulse responses under an i.i.d. contractionary monetary policy shock in model that
rules out default: initial government debt at steady state (blue dashed lines) vs. close to fiscal limit
(black solid lines). Time periods are quarters.
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Figure 3: Marginal effect of possibility of default. Difference in time paths from solving with default
rule in (4.8) and with δt ≡ 0, conditional on debt being near the fiscal limit. All variables shows
deviations in percentage except that inflation, nominal and real rates are in percentage points.
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Figure 4: Impulse responses under an i.i.d. contractionary monetary policy shock in model where
default is possible: initial government debt at steady state (blue dashed lines) vs. close to fiscal
limit (black solid lines). Time periods are quarters.
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Figure 5: Monetary policy sets the risk-free interest rate (red dotted-dashed lines) overlaid with
figure 4. Impulse responses under an i.i.d. contractionary monetary policy shock in model where
default is possible: initial government debt at steady state (blue dashed lines) vs. close to fiscal limit
under risky rate (black solid lines) vs. close to fiscal limit under risk-free rate (red dotted-dashed
lines). Time periods are quarters.
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